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Contemporary debates about academic freedom and institutional autonomy in South 
Africa’s “liberal” universities began in the 1950s, stimulated by the policies and 
legislation for racial segregation.  At the University of Cape Town (UCT), these 
debates were shaped by the influential T B Davie, and since 1959, UCT has offered a 
(usually) annual T B Davie Memorial Lecture at which the symbolic torch of 
academic freedom (extinguished during the apartheid years, and re-ignited after 1994) 
is carried in procession.  But despite this ceremonial and its endurance there is not, 
and has not been since the mid 1980s, a university-wide consensus on the nature of 
academic freedom and its relationship with institutional autonomy.   
 
There are two interrelated – but distinct – traditions of thought and practice in such 
considerations of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. I will call these the 
“classic” and the “contextual” views.    Of course, making a distinction in this way is 
to a degree a rhetorical device:  there are many commonalities, as well as other points 
of view that are not represented here.  My over-arching point, though, is that there is 
no settled “institutional position” on the matter, perhaps in itself testimony to the fact 
that freedom of thought and expression is still alive and well. 
 
The “classic” interpretation holds that academic freedom is the institutional form of a 
human right.  Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are indissoluble.  This 
interpretation was formulated by T.B.Davie and has been continued in subsequent 
generations. The most prominent advocate of this view today is John Higgins who, in 
a series of position papers, public statements and scholarly papers, has both advanced 
Davie’s views and contributed an intellectual exegesis appropriate to the place of the 
university in a changed and changing world. Higgins argues that academic freedom is 
vested in “an autonomous community of teachers and students dedicated to the search 
for, or service of, truth”. This tradition is based on “the constitutive interdependency 
of academic freedom and institutional autonomy”, and the principles of academic 
freedom articulated by T B Davie in the 1950s: “our freedom from external 
interference in a) who shall teach, b) what we teach, c) how we teach, and d) whom 
we teach” (cited in Higgins 2000a).  Seen from this perspective, there is little 
difference between 1959, when the T B Davie lectures were initiated, and the present 
day.  The principle of academic freedom, assailed by the apartheid government, 
continues to be assailed in the post-apartheid period.   
 
In making this argument, Higgins turns to the report of the National Commission on 
Higher Education (1996) and its argument for the “hegemony of government” in the 
cause of socioeconomic development and equity. This requires a culture of 
cooperation and accountability between the university and the state, and furthers the 
needs of neo-liberalism, in which higher education fulfils a utilitarian purpose, steered 
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by the requirements of the labour market.  Higgins sees this approach as further 
consolidated in the Higher Education Act of 1997 and through other legislation, 
putting at risk the core concept of a university. In a second essay, Higgins situates the 
current situation of the South African university in the wider context of a crisis of 
intellectual life in the academy (Higgins 2000b). 
 
While often misunderstood as such, this “classic” argument cannot be typecast as 
reactionary, and Higgins (2000b) shows how his case for academic freedom as an 
inalienable right is distinct from the “culture wars” in the United States, where a 
spurious call for freedom of speech was evoked to undermine progressive thought.  
Indeed, Higgins’ argument is that post-apartheid governments have failed those they 
represent by failing to preserve the conditions necessary for free thought and 
expression: “in reality there is a significant – and deeply disappointing – continuity 
between the restrictive definitions of academic freedom offered in both pre- and post-
apartheid society. Conceptually, this impoverished definition of academic freedom is 
incommensurate with the task of the university in achieving a critical and 
participatory democracy and, in practice, it has allowed the higher-educational system 
to be increasingly defined around a highly restrictive neo-liberal agenda” (Higgins 
2000a: 101). 
 
The “contextual” interpretation of academic freedom is drawn from the same sources 
in liberal philosophy and thought, but allows that the nature of the institutions of state 
and university change with political circumstances.  In this view, the freedoms of 
intellectual life are not automatically associated with the independence of the 
university as an institution: Academic freedom and institutional autonomy are related, 
but distinct concepts.  This “contextual” reading is seen in the work of André du Toit. 
Du Toit argues that the concept of academic freedom does not have determinate 
meaning and is therefore evoked in differing ways from various perspectives: “what is 
needed, is a critical and reflective turn in which rival conceptions of academic 
freedom, and of the threats to it, are not simply asserted or reasserted but interrogated 
for their underlying assumptions, associated political agendas and possible ideological 
functions”. In particular, du Toit asks whether the primary issue is external – the role 
of the state – or internal: “the actual practices of university communities themselves 
and their possibly defective understanding of academic freedom”. The basis of his 
argument is that “in the context of an incomplete transition from older forms of 
collegiality and academic rule, and in the face of increasing demands for new forms 
of accountability, the mere re-assertion of the liberal discourse on academic freedom 
no longer provides a coherent or adequate assistance in getting to grips with the 
current challenges to academic freedom”.  
 
Du Toit argues that the South African tradition of academic freedom that was 
articulated by Davie in the 1950s is a narrow version of more general liberal 
principles, with a contingent emphasis on institutional autonomy, stemming from the 
specific need to counter the controls on university life proposed by the apartheid 
government. Given this, continuity in the role of the state from the 1950s to the 
contemporary period cannot be assumed, and the issue of institutional autonomy 
needs to be contextualized. At the same time, the nature of university management 
has changed, with the result that the university – as an institution – is different now to 
fifty years ago: “a stress on the institutional autonomy of the university must now 
presumably refer not so much to the realm for decision-making by academics, but 
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must in the first instance apply to the practices and policies of the new class of 
professionalised university managers”.  
 
Du Toit sees the “classic” formulation of academic freedom as “crucially ambiguous”, 
in that, in asserting institutional autonomy, “it tended to imply a denial of duties or 
responsibilities that extended beyond the institution's own walls”. This “negative” 
reading of academic freedom would prove incompatible with “a more positive and 
contextual notion of the university’s social responsibility”: a contradiction that was 
brought into sharp relief at UCT in the mid-1980s in disputes about the academic 
boycott of South Africa, and whether it should be supported by progressive academics 
and students, or opposed on the grounds that it undermined the very essence of 
university life.  
 
Consequently, du Toit argues that the “classic” view is unsuited to contemporary 
challenges, and in particular “the increasing pressures for academic accountability, 
associated with the restructuring of academic curricula in terms of explicitly 
articulated programmatic objectives capable of ‘quality assurance’ for their 
educational outcomes. This bears on the vital issue of who is to decide on what may 
be taught as part of the curriculum".  Consequently, “the traditional liberal discourse 
on academic freedom can no longer suffice: it is misleading in that it directs attention 
to supposed external threats rather than to relevant developments closer home; it is 
outdated in so far as the concern with institutional autonomy does not take account of 
the changed circumstances brought about by the managerial revolution within the 
universities themselves; and it is incoherent when applied to current issues of internal 
accountability and academic authority within the university community” (du Toit 
2000a). 
 
By decoupling academic freedom from institutional autonomy, du Toit opens up a 
space for discussing the ethical issue of the appropriate balance between the right to 
academic freedom, and the responsibilities it carries.  While the concept of ethical 
responsibility is inherent in the “classical” view, where the argument is that academic 
freedom and institutional autonomy should be inalienable to ensure the continuity of 
independent critical thought essential to democratic values in society at large, it is 
difficult to progress beyond the absolute prohibition on state involvement in the 
affairs of the academy.  In contrast, the “contextual” view allows that the state has a 
legitimate interest in the internal affairs of the university, in the interests of such 
public goods as economic development and social justice.  
 
Du Toit advances this argument by introducing the concept of “republican” freedom 
of speech.  In contrast to the liberal emphasis on individual rights and the prohibition 
on restriction of expression, the republican philosophy carries an obligation to speak 
out freely in the public interest: “freedom of speech is a precondition for the good 
society; it is the duty of citizens or members of the community to speak their mind 
freely and honestly, without fear of the consequences”. This is closely associated with 
the idea of collegiality, in turn at the heart of the concept of university governance, 
and includes an obligation of active participation in the affairs of the institution. In 
turn again, possibilities for appropriate accountability to society are opened: “it is one 
of the problematic features of the liberal concept of academic freedom that demands 
for accountability tend to be conceived as external interferences within the 
autonomous domain of the university and academic activity.  By contrast the 
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republican  notion of free public speech is not anti-thetical to notions of social 
accountability; on the contrary it is inherent in academic freedom as a civic virtue and 
responsibility that it must give proper account of itself to the public at large … 
academic freedom is not conceived negatively in terms of individual and institutional 
rights and protection against external interference (by the state, the public or even 
university administrators); rather it is conceived positively in terms of empowering 
viable intellectual discourse communities, both within the university and also able to 
reach out, engage with and give account of themselves to wider communities, society 
and the state more generally” (du Toit 2000b). 
 
In my own work, conducted jointly with Ashley Symes (Hall and Symes 2005), I 
build on the contextual approach, advancing the concept of “conditional autonomy” as 
allowing “both for the procedural role of the state in ensuring the effective use of 
public money and the substantive rights of higher education institutions to academic 
freedom in teaching and research”. The key test is legitimacy: “before 1994, the claim 
to legitimacy for government policies in higher education rested on meeting the 
interests of the white minority. Governance arrangements directed student 
participation, resource allocations and research funding to this end, and defied 
international trends. After 1994, the legitimacy of government policies has been 
founded in a discourse that stresses the interests of all South Africans. Shifts in 
governance arrangements, that in turn frame policies for increasing equitable 
participation in higher education and for achieving outputs considered appropriate for 
a developing economy, reflect an interpretation of the appropriate relationship 
between the state and individual institutions.”  
 
We note that the defining trend in university governance in South Africa, expressed 
through legislation and amendments to the Higher Education Act, has been increasing 
state control. This requires an appropriate conceptualization of the accountability of 
government for the use of public funds, and the autonomy appropriate to a university: 
“what is currently missing in the discourse of governance is a conceptual device that 
acknowledges the legitimate role of the state in steering the public higher education 
system, while also recognising the rights of individual institutions to autonomous 
governance over their central business of research, teaching and learning”. The 
concept of “conditional autonomy” is proposed to address this issue: “Conditional 
autonomy recognises the role of the state in steering the system and its outcomes 
through procedural controls, while respecting the autonomy of individual institutions 
in the substantive fields of their intellectual work” (Hall and Symes 2005). 
 
We differentiate “substantive autonomy” – the authority of a university to determine 
its own objectives and academic programmes – from “procedural autonomy”: the 
right to determine how these goals will be pursued, and how effect will be given to 
academic programmes. This differentiation provides the means of determining the 
respective rights and responsibilities of universities and the state. Taken together, they 
constitute the appropriate conditions of autonomy.  
 
Does this concept of conditional autonomy constitute a surrender of academic 
freedom?  We argue that, to the contrary, accepting conditional autonomy is an 
effective defence of academic freedom: “conditional autonomy provides the basis for 
asserting the right of individual institutions to pursue research objectives on their own 
terms, to interpret their social responsibilities, to determine the content of the 
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curriculum and to teach in the manner that they think best. This is because conditional 
autonomy recognises that a democratic state will always have a legitimate, 
overarching accountability for the disbursement of public funds and for the 
authentication of academic qualifications. By distinguishing this framework of 
procedures from the substantive content of research, teaching and social 
responsiveness, the concept of conditional autonomy helps to define the distinction 
between state steering of higher education and state interference in the academic 
domain”.  
 
☯ 
 
Leaving aside these disagreement between the “classicists” and the “contextualists”, it 
is a matter of record that academic freedom has not been defended or advanced with 
the same vigour a decade into democracy as it was when the liberal university was at 
loggerheads with the apartheid state. In particular, the community of scholars has 
taken a very different approach to legislative proposals after 1994 than before 
democracy was won. In the apartheid state, amendments to the legislation that sought 
to impose increased state controls were vehemently contested in terms of the “classic” 
principles of academic freedom.  After 1994, these “classic” principles continued to 
be affirmed symbolically and intellectually, through the writing of a small number of 
individuals.  However, the 1997 Higher Education Act, and particularly its series of 
subsequent amendments which have considerably extended the authority of the state, 
and diminished the autonomy of the institution, have not been protested.  There will 
be a range of reasons for this pre- and post-1994 contrast, and one of them must be the 
active participation of prominent scholars from universities in framing policies and 
legislation (including the Constitution) for the democratic order.  Whatever one’s 
view of academic freedom and institutional autonomy, it must be acknowledged that 
the position of the university relative to the state was less complex before 1994 than 
after the inauguration of a democratic – and legitimate – political order. 
 
There are, however, indications that issues around academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy are taking a new form, shaped by questions of institutional transformation. 
As with the mid 1980s, when the debate revolved around the question of the academic 
boycott, current discussion has been prompted by specific issues which raise, in their 
turn, general principles.  Thus in June 2005 the University of Cape Town’s Academic 
Freedom Committee resolved that “unfounded charges of racism” are “a threat to the 
free exchange of ideas”, urging “members of the University community who are 
witness to ill-considered and unfounded accusations of racism to speak out promptly 
against such labelling”.1 Subsequently, this concept of academic freedom was 
                                                 
1 “The Academic Freedom Committee (AFC) reports the Committee’s concern 
about the dampening effect that unfounded charges of racism have on campus 
debate about important University and social issues in which race is or is 
perceived to be an element.  The Committee regards this as a threat to the free 
exchange of ideas.  In order to foster an environment in which open debate can 
take place, the Committee urges: 
•        the University community not to level ill-considered and unfounded 
accusations of racism, particularly in response to differences of opinion; 
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contested from within the university: “the call by the Academic Freedom Committee 
to allow those accused of racism to complain appears to pre-empt attempts to 
establish a more effective racial harassment mechanism on campus, affording those 
accused of racism a space for action when those feeling aggrieved do not feel they 
have been provided an effective institutional space. This, of course, is deeply ironic, 
given that the Academic Freedom Committee’s brief is to promote dialogue and 
openness on campus. In light of the current debate about the nature of transformation 
at UCT, it would be more helpful if academic freedom was not viewed as separable 
from the institutional culture in which debate takes place on campus. It would have 
been far more helpful for the committee’s call to have urged the rapid finalization of 
the racial harassment policy and the establishment of credible, transparent and fair 
mechanisms to resolve allegations of racism (and other forms of discrimination) on 
campus” (London 2005). 
 
This exchange, followed by a well-attended public debate on the issue, takes forward 
du Toit’s republican principle of free speech, the obligation to speak out to promote 
the public good, and insists that the right of academic freedom cannot be claimed 
without taking account of the internal circumstances of the academy – the persistence 
of unfair discrimination by race and gender.  In other words, the concept of a 
“community of scholars”, standing united in the defence of truth and justice, is 
corrupted if the conditions of the academy do not permit equality within the 
community of scholars itself. In a way, this current debate completes a circle with TB 
Davie’s formulation of academic freedom half a century ago.  Then, the university 
was a homogenous community (overwhelmingly white, predominantly male, English 
speaking, economically privileged) facing outwards to a highly unequal society in 
which discrimination by race was being enforced and enshrined in law.  Now, the 
university is a diverse community (increasingly black, increasingly representative by 
gender, multilingual, and with students from a wide range of economic backgrounds) 
looking inwards at the challenges of achieving and maintaining social justice within 
itself.  In this context, the issue of whether academic freedom is an absolute right or a 
conditional privilege remains unresolved. 
 
In essence, this juxtaposition of the claim to academic freedom with the continuation 
of discrimination within the university is a requirement that rights are linked to 
responsibilities.  This has been captured in Njabulo Ndebele’s framing of the 
challenge ahead for the University of Cape Town: “The guiding approach to 
transformation is that it should be a total institutional experience, touching on much of 
what we do … At the heart of this objective is our ability to implement policy driven 
decisions around the core academic function of the university, through effective 
coordination and the capability to ensure that processes for implementation are 
                                                                                                                                            
•        members of the University community who are witness to ill-considered 
and unfounded accusations of racism to speak out promptly against such 
labelling; and 
•        those who are victims of unfounded charges of racism, to lodge a 
complaint with the University Discrimination and Harassment Office 
(Phone: 650-3530).”   
Principal’s Circular, June 2005 
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rigorously followed … It is urgent that we now go further than the two climate 
surveys we have had recently and to use them as important data for us to work 
actively through transformative dialogue toward creating an institutional environment 
at UCT experienced as being more open, more honest, more trusting, more 
accommodating, more creative at the same time that it continues to be no less robust 
as an academic institution. We must open more spaces for such dialogue on campus 
that are designed to have us cross many boundaries of what is discussable both on 
campus and beyond. The pursuit of truth and the expression of ideas should flourish 
even more and better in such an environment. It is in such an environment that we 
must achieve higher throughput and graduation rates, and higher research outputs”.2   
 
The pursuit of truth and the free expression of ideas – the essence of T B Davie’s 
formulation of academic freedom in the 1950s – can only advance if the university is 
a “safe space”, free of unfair discrimination. 
 
In looking to the future, a key challenge will be the “rhetoric of participation”: how 
can controversial issues be argued without the form that debate takes forcing closure?  
This is an issue raised, from different perspectives on academic freedom, by both 
Higgins and London. Higgins (2000a) notes that academic freedom is in danger of 
becoming a “received idea” – a concept for which the speaker’s position is assumed in 
advance, leading to the neglect of the substance of the argument. And London 
complains that, in its resolution decrying unsubstantiated allegations of racism, it is 
the Academic Freedom Committee that is contributing to the closure of debate: “I find 
the position of the Academic Freedom Committee wholly unhelpful. At best, it is 
extremely naïve and, at worst, it will be perceived as another attempt by the institution 
(through one of its highly-regarded committees) to close down debate on racism at 
UCT”.  In this respect, it must be noted that the relationship between academic 
freedom and freedom of speech within the university is far from resolved.  There is 
continuity between the position taken in the mid 1980s, when Senate resolved, in the 
cause of academic freedom, to limit the freedom of speech (through disciplinary 
action) of those within the University who advocated the academic boycott, and the 
current debate, where the Academic Freedom Committee has proposed constraints on 
those who may use their freedom of speech to allege racism.   
 
Finally, it is notable that the limit cases of academic freedom remain ambiguous.  This 
was noted by Higgins (2000b) in his overview of contemporary writing on the issue, 
and by du Toit (2000b), who reminded us that the concept of academic freedom “is 
related to, though by no means synonymous with, the basic right to freedom of speech 
… Academic freedom may actually require important restrictions on general freedom 
of speech”.    
 
This can be illustrated through a simple mind experiment.  Imagine a situation in 
which a lecturer, evoking the “classic” formulation of academic freedom as the right 
to decide what to teach without interference or hindrance, teaches that members of the 
university community of a race different to her or his own are genetically inferior and 
are therefore not qualified to take part in the lecturer’s classes.  Should the university 
act to defend the academic freedom of the lecturer, or should the university take 
                                                 
2 Professor Njabulo S Ndebele, Vice Chancellor. “Living Transformation”, October 
2005. 
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action against the lecturer in the interests of those students whose academic freedom 
has been violated by their exclusion?  If the university does take action against the 
lecturer, then how can academic freedom be an absolute value?  And if the university 
does not take action, how can it be defending academic freedom? This contradiction is 
inherent in the current terms of reference of UCT’s Academic Freedom Committee, 
which require that it “promote academic freedom, including university autonomy, 
within and outside UCT, and to take appropriate action when it is infringed”.  
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